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PREPARING FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION
SCOTT BUKSTEIN*
In December 2011, National Basketball Association (NBA)
team owners and the National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA) entered into a new Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA).1  The term of the CBA is ten NBA seasons, from December
8, 2011 through June 30, 2021.2  However, the NBA and the NBPA
each have an option to terminate the agreement effective as of June
30, 2017 following the sixth season of the current CBA; the options
must be exercised on or before December 15, 2016.3  NBA players
are expected to opt out of the current CBA.4  NBA owners could
* Mr. Scott Bukstein is the Director of the DeVos Undergraduate Sport Busi-
ness Management Program and the Assistant Director of the DeVos Graduate
Sport Business Management Program at the University of Central Florida.  In addi-
tion, Mr. Bukstein is an Adjunct Assistant Professor within the Goizueta Business
School at Emory University as well as an Adjunct Instructor within the College of
Business at the University of South Florida.  Mr. Bukstein received his law degree
from the University of Minnesota Law School.  Prior to becoming a college profes-
sor and administrator, Mr. Bukstein worked as a corporate attorney at Faegre &
Benson LLP (now Faegre Baker Daniels) in Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he
represented clients in a wide variety of transactional matters, including public and
private mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance and securities, venture capital
financings, and general corporate counseling.  Also, Mr. Bukstein provided legal
counsel to several sport organizations.  Notably, Mr. Bukstein negotiated the Nam-
ing Rights Agreement for Target Corporation’s sponsorship of the new Minnesota
Twins baseball stadium and represented Minnesota Hockey Ventures Group in its
sale of the Minnesota Swarm lacrosse team.
1. See NBA Lockout Timeline, NBA (Dec. 9, 2011, 8:15 AM), http://www.nba
.com/2011/news/09/09/labor-timeline/  (NBA owners and NBPA eventually
agreed to new comprehensive CBA on December 8, 2011 after 161-day lockout
that resulted in 16 lost games for each team during the 2011-2012 NBA regular
season).
2. See NBA 2011 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. XXXIX, sec. 1
(Dec. 8, 2011) [hereinafter NBA CBA], available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/
2011 (“This Agreement shall be effective from December 8, 2011 and, unless ter-
minated pursuant to the provisions of this Article XXXIX, shall continue in full
force and effect through June 30, 2021”).
3. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, sec. 2 (“The NBA and the Players Association
shall each have the option to terminate this Agreement on June 30, 2017 by serv-
ing written notice of its exercise of such option on the other party on or before
December 15, 2016”).
4. See Larry Coon, New Cap, Tax and Lockout Projections, CBA FAQ BLOG (Apr.
18, 2014), http://cbafaq.com/blog/ (“My prediction is that the players will opt-
out of the agreement in 2017.”).
(373)
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374 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 373
also decide to opt out of the CBA regardless of the decision made
by NBA players.5
NBA players, as well as NBA owners, have already started the
strategic planning process related to the possibility of either the
players or the owners exercising the right to opt out of the CBA.
However, neither the players nor the owners will conclusively state
whether the NBPA or the NBA definitively plan to opt out of the
current CBA.  For example, in April 2014, Ron Klempner—then-
current acting executive director of the NBPA—explained that the
players association “negotiated for the right to opt out of the CBA,
and just as the owners will do, the players will consider our options
at the appropriate time.  It’s way too early to commit to any deci-
sion one way or the other.”6  Adam Silver, Commissioner of the
NBA, responded that league owners will “always be prepared, but
[he has] no expectation that [the players are] going to opt out.
[There have not been] any discussions whatsoever about that
possibility.”7
Nonetheless, both the NBPA and league owners have made
business decisions knowing that it is possible (if not probable) that
games will be canceled during the 2017-2018 NBA season due to a
labor dispute that results in a lockout (i.e., work stoppage).8  Play-
ers have been advised by the NBPA to accept paychecks over an 18-
month period for the 2016-2017 NBA season instead of the stan-
dard 12-month period as one mechanism to help players prepare
financially for a potential work stoppage during the 2017-2018 NBA
5. See CBA 101: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION AND THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, NBA (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.nba.com/.ele-
ment/mp3/2.0/sect/podcastmp3/PDF/CBA101.pdf.  The NBA had the option to
extend the previous CBA (entered into in 2005) for one year (through June 30,
2012) but declined to exercise that option.  NBA owners determined that the reve-
nue allocation required under the previous CBA was not financially sustainable.
6. Brian Mahoney, Silver: Premature to Say Union Will Opt Out of CBA, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS, Apr. 24, 2014, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/silver-prema-
ture-say-union-will-opt-out-cba.  Klempner also stated the following: “Our league’s
recently reported economic successes come as no surprise to the players.” See id.
7. See Mahoney, supra note 6.  Silver further opined that “it’s premature,
frankly, for either side to be making determinations about how well this deal has
or hasn’t worked . . . So I don’t really buy into sort of that speculation that they’re
already planning to opt out or that we’re thinking about it.” See id.
8. See NBA Commences Lockout of Its Players, NBA (June 30, 2011, 7:14 PM),
http://www.nba.com/2011/news/06/30/lockout-statement/ (stating that in event
of lockout, NBA players would not receive salary compensation and would not be
allowed to use team facilities for any purpose; and teams would not be allowed to
negotiate player contracts or conduct any practices or similar sessions with
players).
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season.9  Owners have entered into agreements with media rights
partners in which fee payments from the networks to the NBA will
still be made in the event of a work stoppage.10
NBA owners and NBPA leaders are also carefully scrutinizing
the current CBA and beginning to identify specific terms and provi-
sions each group wants added, eliminated and/or revised in a new
CBA as part of the overall negotiation preparation process.  In April
2014, league owners met to discuss the effectiveness of the current
CBA.  NBA Commissioner Adam Silver stated the following:
We presented sort of the facts as we know them so far
under this agreement.  Is [the CBA] working in ways we
predicted, here are things that we would not have pre-
dicted under the agreement, here’s the amount of free
agency movement we’re seeing, here’s how it’s working ec-
onomically for the league. And I would assume the union
at some point will do those same things.11
Further, in July 2014, new NBPA executive director Michele Rob-
erts commented:
As far as I’m concerned, preparations for CBA negotia-
tions started yesterday. It’s at the top of my list of things
that I’ve been instructed to begin the process of preparing
for, and sure it’s a lot to do, but I’ve never been shy about
hard work and long hours, so we’ll get it done. We’ll be
ready.12
9. See NBA CBA supra note 2, art. II, sec. 3(d) (stating that although “the
default payment schedule is 24 semi-monthly installments over a 12-month period,
players have option to request payment over a period of 6 months or 18 months
instead of 12 months).
10. See Sam Amick & Jeff Zillgitt, NBA Union Wants Players to Prepare for Work
Stoppage, USA TODAY (July 1, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nba/salaries/2014/07/01/nbpa-union-players-18-month-contracts-prepare-
for-lockout/11902881/ (“As we have learned in the past, the owners have made
provisions with the TV networks to continue to receive rights fees throughout a
work stoppage, and there is no reason the players should not make every effort to
take the same precaution.”); Scott Soshnick, LeBron Advised to Take Less Money in
More Paychecks by Union, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2014, 1:20 PM), http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/2014-07-01/lebron-advised-to-take-less-money-in-more-paychecks-
by-nba-union.html (“Every chance the owners have had they’ve opted out of an
agreement.  We can’t control what they’re going to do.  All we’re going to do is
prepare ourselves.”).
11. Mahoney, supra note 6.
12. NBA Players Union Elects a New Director, ESPN (July 29, 2014, 9:24 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/wire?section=nba&id=11280794.  According to
Charles Grantham, executive director of the NBPA from 1988-1995, “Ideally,
whether labor or management, you begin work on the next negotiation the day
after you sign the last agreement.”  Sean Deveney, The Baseline: Another Lockout
3
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This Article provides a preview of the primary CBA deal terms
that NBA owners and the NBPA are expected to focus on in the
months leading up to the December 2016 opt-out deadline.  Part I
summarizes the current NBA business model and economic cli-
mate.  It also explains how the league’s new media rights agree-
ment, recent team profitability, and increased franchise values
impact the probability of players and/or owners opting out of the
current CBA.  Part II examines the most recent collective bargain-
ing process between NBA owners and players in 2010-2011 and
highlights some of the key business (i.e., “system”) issues negotiated
in 2010-2011.  Part III anticipates the next round of collective bar-
gaining in the NBA and details some of the principal deal terms
that players and owners will need to negotiate and resolve.  This
Article concludes with a discussion of the expected outcome—one
similar to the 2011 outcome—which is less than ideal, and can and
should be avoided.
I. CURRENT NBA BUSINESS MODEL AND ECONOMIC CLIMATE:
LEAGUE MEDIA RIGHTS, TEAM PROFITABILITY
AND FRANCHISE VALUES
Similar to other professional sport leagues in the United States,
the NBA attempts to create competitive balance among its thirty
(30) teams.13  The NBA utilizes several mechanisms to produce
competitive balance (i.e., team parity which leads to unpredictable
game outcomes).14  For example, the NBA uses a reverse-order
draft in which teams with the worst records in the previous season
are given the opportunity to select higher in the draft.  Also, reve-
nue sharing and salary caps are two additional mechanisms that at-
tempt to produce competitive balance.15  The NBA’s current
Ahead? ‘We Know The Storm Is Coming.,’ SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 7, 2014, 10:03 AM),
http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/story/2014-03-06/nba-lockout-cba-commis-
sioner-adam-silver-nbpa-union-chris-paul-president-executive-director-billy-hunter-
charles-grantham-david-stern.
13. See SCOTT ROSNER & KENNETH SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS 141
(2nd ed. 2010) (“All professional sports leagues are deeply concerned about the
same two basic issues: competitive balance and revenue sharing”).  One of the rea-
sons why the NBA claimed the league needed a new labor agreement in 2011 was
“to address the league’s competitive balance problems.”  David J. Berri, Did the
Players Give Up Money to Make the NBA Better? Exploring the 2011 Collective Bargaining
Agreement in the National Basketball Association, 7 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 158, 161 (2012).
Since 1980, only nine different teams have won the NBA title. See id.
14. See ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 13, at 146 (“A predictable league
ultimately becomes of little interest to its followers”).
15. See id. at 141 (explaining that revenue sharing can be defined as “the
amount of revenues earned by members of a professional sports league that are
4
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revenue sharing plan redistributes money from teams that generate
significant local revenue (e.g., “big market” teams such as the Chi-
cago Bulls, Los Angeles Lakers, and New York Knicks) to teams that
generate less local revenue (e.g., “small market” teams such as the
Minnesota Timberwolves, Milwaukee Bucks, and Orlando Magic).16
The NBA’s salary cap limits the amount of money each team is al-
lowed to spend on player salaries.  Salary caps strive to create com-
petitive balance on the basketball court by creating competitive
financial balance with respect to limiting what teams are permitted
to spend on player compensation each NBA season.17
The league’s salary cap directly impacts player salaries.  The
salary cap each year is calculated based on a percentage of “Basket-
ball Related Income” (“BRI”).18  The NBA CBA contains a detailed
formula for determining BRI, which includes most revenues earned
at the league and team levels.  Sources of revenue include league
licensing revenue, media rights and corporate partnership agree-
ments as well as team revenue streams such as gate receipts, local
shared by all league teams, regardless of the teams’ contributions to the genera-
tion of these revenues”).
16. See NBA Board of Governors Ratify 10-Year CBA, NBA (Dec. 8, 2011, 6:44
PM), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/12/08/labor-deal-reached/ (describing
agreed upon new revenue sharing plan).  NBA owners are permitted to unilater-
ally implement and make changes to the league’s revenue sharing plan.  Prior to
the 2011 NBA CBA, revenue sharing was somewhat limited.  The league’s luxury
tax, which required teams who exceeded a certain payroll threshold to pay a “fine,”
was the primary funding source for league revenue sharing during the 2005 CBA.
When the 2011 CBA was ratified in December 2011, the NBA Board of Governors
also voted to approve a new revenue sharing plan that substantially increased the
funds previously shared among NBA teams in part by including local team revenue
in the revenue sharing equation.  In response, then-current NBA Commissioner
David Stern made the following comment: “The Board realized that it was impera-
tive that our revenue sharing program be improved. We have found a solution that
should provide our league with better competitive balance.” Id.  David Stern also
explained that net transfers under the new league revenue sharing system would
be “a multiple of what they were under the old deal of revenue sharing.”  Steve
Aschburner, Revenue Sharing a Vital (Yet Secretive) Component to Talks, NBA (Sept. 20,
2011, 10:23 AM), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/features/steve_aschburner/
09/20/revenue-sharing-still-vital/index.html.  Stern estimates that the net trans-
fers would be approximately “three times” the amount shared in 2010-2011 (i.e.,
$60 million); this would result in about $15 million being transferred to each “rev-
enue recipient” under the new revenue sharing system, with approximately $180
million in total team revenues being shared. See id.
17. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII (discussing NBA’s “soft” salary cap,
which means there are several exceptions that allow teams to exceed salary cap in
specific situations).  David Stern stated that “[e]ven in a league where one team
could pay [$100 million] to its roster, another team could pay [$50 million] and
would be economically successful—our owners and our fans don’t want it because
it wouldn’t be competitive.”  Aschburner, supra note 16.
18. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, sec. 1 (defining Basketball Related
Income).  Players negotiate with the owners to receive a percentage share of BRI.
5
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media rights deals, and team sponsorship agreements.  BRI essen-
tially indicates the financial health of the NBA.  Player salaries cor-
relate with team and league revenue.  For example, BRI increased
from $3.643 billion in 2009-2010 to $3.817 billion in 2010-2011.
Based on the terms of the NBA CBA in effect from 2005-2011, NBA
players received 57% of these total BRI amounts (i.e., $2.076 billion
in 2009-2010 and $2.176 billion in 2010-2011).19  The salary cap for
each NBA team during the 2009-2010 season was $57.7 million and
the salary cap for the 2010-2011 season was approximately $58 mil-
lion.20  At the time of this Article, the salary cap for the 2014-2015
NBA season reached an all-time high: $63 million.21 The league has
projected an increase in the salary cap to $66.5 million for the 2015-
2016 NBA season.22  For the 2016-2017 NBA season, the salary cap
is expected to increase exponentially—perhaps to over $90 mil-
lion—based primarily on a recently signed new league media rights
deal, which will be discussed in further detail below.23
The NBA is a private company.  Therefore, its financial state-
ments are not publicly available.  As a result, the true profitability of
the league and its 30 individual teams is unclear.  For example, ac-
cording to the NBA, the league lost money during every year of the
now-expired CBA that was in effect from 2005 to 2011—including a
$340 million loss during the 2009-2010 NBA season.24  Media out-
lets such as Forbes and The New York Times have attempted to esti-
mate the profits and losses of NBA teams without access to
complete league and team-audited financials.  For example, during
19. See Steve Aschburner, NBA, Union Finalize Audit of Revenues, Player Compen-
sation, NBA (July 22, 2011), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/07/22/bri-audit/
(“Player compensation increased in each season of the six-year CBA, while the
NBA has cited losses in each of the six seasons totaling more than $1.5 billion.
While BRI has increased, the owners have said their non-player expenses have
risen at a greater rate.”).
20. See NBA Salary Cap Set For 2009-10 Season, NBA (July 7, 2009, 10:30 PM),
http://www.nba.com/2009/news/07/07/salarycap.ap/; NBA Salary Cap For 2010-
11 Season Set At $58.044 Million, NBA (July 7, 2010, 7:41 PM), http://www.nba
.com/2010/news/07/07/salary.cap/.
21. See Salary Cap For 2014-15 Season Jumps to $63 Million, NBA (July 9, 2014,
5:07 PM), http://www.nba.com/2014/news/07/09/salary-cap-increases/.
22. See Zach Lowe, How the NBA’s New TV Deal Could Blow Up the Salary Cap,
GRANTLAND (Oct. 6, 2014), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/nbas-new-tv-deal-
blow-up-the-salary-cap/; Coon, supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 22 (“The importance of the league’s cap situa-
tion cannot be overstated. It has been the single biggest topic of conversation
among team executives for the last year. The salary cap rises and falls hand in hand
with league revenues, and this TV contract will be the largest injection of revenues
in NBA history”).
24. See NBA’s Response to July 6 Story on League’s Financial Losses, NBA (July 6,
2011, 2:42 PM) http://www.nba.com/2011/news/07/06/nba-rebuttal/.
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the same 2005-2011 time period for which the NBA claimed the
league lost money each year, statistician Nate Silver concluded the
NBA was a “fundamentally healthy and profitable business” that
made $183 million in 2009-2010 before interest and taxes.25  In ad-
dition, while Forbes claimed that 17  of the 30 NBA teams lost money
during the 2009-2010 NBA season, the NBA countered with its
claim that 23 NBA teams had net income losses during that same
season.26  The NBPA also questioned the NBA’s exact figures, stat-
ing that a large portion of the “losses” reported by the NBA were
actually accounting “book losses” rather than actual cash losses.27
The key take away is that players and owners have consistently dis-
agreed on league and team revenues and expenses.
Despite the lack of reliable data on league and team revenues
and expenses, the league and its member teams are unquestionably
in better financial shape today than they were under the 2005 CBA.
In October 2014, Commissioner Silver mentioned that about one-
third of teams are still not profitable under the current CBA and
corresponding NBA financial system;28 although this is an improve-
ment from the 23 teams that allegedly lost money less than five
years earlier.  Recent sales of NBA teams combined with a new
league media rights deal also impact the perceived (and actual) fi-
nancial viability of the league and its member teams.29
In October 2014, the NBA announced a new nine-year, $24
billion media rights agreement with Turner Broadcasting and
ESPN.30  Beginning with the 2016-2017 NBA season, NBA teams will
receive a significant boost in revenue based on this new media
25. Nate Silver, Calling Foul on NBA’s Claims of Financial Distress, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/
calling-foul-on-n-b-a-s-claims-of-financial-distress/?_r=0. See also Berri, supra note
13, at 160 (“The NBA officially disputed [Nate] Silver’s analysis but failed to re-
lease objective numbers that contradicted Silver’s analysis”).
26. See Silver, supra note 25 (analyzing NBA’s financials). But see NBA’s Re-
sponse to July 6 Story on League’s Financial Losses, supra note 24 (rebutting Forbes’s
claims).
27. See Milad Sedeh, The NBPA Disclaimer: The End of the Bargaining Relationship
or a Sham?, 10 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 56, 57 (2013).
28. See Ohm Youngmisuk, Commish: ‘Premature’ to Worry, ESPN (Oct. 22, 2014,
8:18 PM), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/11746763/nba-commissioner-
adam-silver-says-too-early-worry-potential-work-stoppage.
29. See NBA Extends Partnership with Turner Broadcasting, Disney, NBA (Oct. 6,
2014, 10:03 AM), http://www.nba.com/2014/news/10/06/nba-media-deal-disney-
turner-sports/.  In addition, NBA teams have recently sold for record amounts.
For example, the Los Angeles Clippers sold for $2 billion in 2014, the Milwaukee
Bucks sold for $550 million in 2014, and the Sacramento Kings sold for $534 mil-
lion in 2013.  For a discussion of recent sales of NBA teams, see infra notes 32-35
and accompanying text.
30. See id.
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rights deal, that is an increase from approximately $30 million per
team each year to over $80 million per team each year.  Upon
learning about the new league media rights deal, Michele Roberts,
executive director of the NBPA, commented:
The new television and media deals are good news for all
of the stakeholders in the NBA . . . Although we have seen
strong revenue growth and significant increases in
franchise values over the past three years, it is clear that
the league is now entering a period of unprecedented rev-
enue growth. Our job will be to ensure that the players
receive their fair share of the results of their efforts.31
Recent purchases of NBA franchises also highlight the finan-
cial health of the NBA.  In August 2014, Steve Ballmer purchased
the Los Angeles Clippers for a record $2 billion, which equaled
over twelve times the expected team revenue for the 2014-2015
NBA season.32  Before the sale of the Clippers, the record amount
paid for an NBA team was $550 million for the Milwaukee Bucks
earlier in 2014; this sales price reflected a “5x multiple” of the
Bucks’ annual revenue.33  While some NBA teams might have ex-
penses that exceed revenue in particular years, NBA owners invest
in teams with the expectation that the team will appreciate in value
so that the owner will experience significant capital gains upon sell-
ing the team.34  For example, the Sacramento Kings were sold for
$534 million in 2013, less than 15 years after the Maloof brothers
purchased the franchise in 1999 for $185 million.35  According to
31. Jeff Zillgitt, NBA Will Have More Programming Under New TV Deal, USA TO-
DAY (Oct. 6, 2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2014/
10/06/nba-tv-deal-espn-turner/16807359/.
32. See Report of Valuation and Financial Analysis of Los Angeles Clippers by
Bank of America Merrill Lynch for Project Claret, Project Claret: Preliminary In-
dicative Valuation Considerations 3 (May 25, 2014) [hereinafter Project Claret],
available at http://a.espncdn.com/pdf/2014/0723/Exhibit_43.pdf (indicating ex-
pected annual revenue of $164.9 million for 2014-2015).
33. See Project Claret, supra note 32, at 7 (explaining that Los Angeles home
market is “strikingly different” than home markets of Bucks and Kings and, there-
fore, valuation for Clippers should not be based on sales valuations for Bucks or
Kings).
34. See ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 13, at 10 (explaining that capital
gains owner receives from selling team can more than offset losses team has in-
curred from ongoing operations).
35. See Project Claret, supra note 32, at 5.  From 2002 to 2012, all NBA teams
sold went for an amount between $200 million and $450 million. See id.
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estimates by Forbes, “[t]he average NBA franchise is worth (equity
plus debt) $634 million, up 25% over [2013].”36
Differing views related to franchise values along with the actual
profits and losses of the NBA and its member teams played a signifi-
cant role in the most-recent collective bargaining process between
players and owners.  League and team finances are also expected to
play a significant role in the next round of collective bargaining
between owners and players.37  The following section of this article
provides an overview of the most-recent collective bargaining pro-
cess and highlights some of the primary deal terms that owners and
players focused on during CBA negotiations in 2010-2011.
II. THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS IN 2010-2011 AND ITS
KEY BUSINESS / SYSTEM ISSUES
The 2005 NBA CBA was scheduled to expire on June 30, 2011.
In January 2010, the NBA sent its first official CBA proposal to the
NBPA.38  The NBPA quickly rejected the NBA proposal; then-cur-
rent NBPA executive director Billy Hunter stated the following:
“Our position was it was a nonstarter.”39  In general, the NBPA was
36. Kurt Badenhausen, As Stern Says Goodbye, Knicks, Lakers Set Records as NBA’s
Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2014, 9:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kurtbadenhausen/2014/01/22/as-stern-says-goodbye-knicks-lakers-set-re
cords-as-nbas-most-valuable-teams/.
37. See, e.g., Josh Robbins, Orlando Magic CEO Says the Franchise Still Doesn’t
Make a Profit, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 22, 2014, 7:53 AM), http://
touch.orlandosentinel.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-79002784/ (quoting Orlando
Magic CEO Alex Martins: “The assertion that the Magic made a profit last year is
inaccurate. We did not make a profit last year.  We have not made a profit in over a
decade.”).
38. See Jonathan Abrams, The NBA Lockout Timeline, GRANTLAND (Nov. 11,
2011), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/the-nba-lockout-timeline/ (discussing
timeline of NBA lockout).  Informal negotiations for the 2011 NBA CBA arguably
started in February 2009 at the NBA All-Star Game in Phoenix.  During a press
conference, then-current NBA Commissioner David Stern made the following
comments directed at then-current NBPA executive director Billy Hunter:
And the beauty of the NBA is that we have this perpetual flow of ex-
traordinary talent that flows into Billy’s union, for whom he gets 57 per-
cent of every dollar that we generate. . . .  We spend 43 percent on other
expenses and the owners wind up with nothing. . . . We meet with the
union regularly. We turn over everything we possibly can. We may argue
about what they say, but you are not going to be able to argue about what
they are, because it is too important a subject.
Id.  Nonetheless, the vast majority of substantive CBA related negotiations took
place in 2010 and 2011.
39. Hunter: No Lockout Imminent, ESPN (Feb. 13, 2010, 2:40 AM), http://
sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=4910277.  Billy Hunter was terminated
from his role of NBPA executive director in February 2013. See Jeff Zillgitt, Billy
Hunter Fired by NBA Players, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2013, 10:16 PM), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2013/02/16/billy-hunter-fired-players-union-
9
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content with many of the core provisions in the 2005 CBA.  Con-
versely, the owners were pushing for some significant system
changes to the 2005 CBA.  The remainder of this section discusses
some of the principal deal terms that were negotiated and incorpo-
rated into the 2011 CBA.  This section also provides an overview of
the strategic business and legal decisions made by the NBA and the
NBPA during the collective bargaining process in 2010 and 2011 as
a preview to the next round of collective bargaining that will likely
take place in 2016 and 2017.
A. Basketball Related Income
The split of revenue between owners and players may have
been the most significant and contentious issue during the 2011
CBA negotiation process.40  NBA players were guaranteed 57% of
BRI in salaries and benefits under the 2005 CBA.41  NBA owners
wanted to substantially reduce players’ share of BRI in the 2011
CBA.  The NBPA claimed that from January 2010 to October 2011,
NBA owners insisted on reducing the players’ share of BRI to an
average of 46-47%.42  In June 2011, the NBPA countered the NBA
owners’ offer by proposing to reduce players’ share of BRI to 52.4%
during the first year of the CBA and then gradually increasing that
nbpa-executive-director/1924969/ (quoting former NBPA president Derek Fisher
as making following statement: “Players representatives in the general body of our
association have made their voice and their votes heard.  Today, the motion was
raised, seconded and passed unanimously that we will terminate the employment
of Billy Hunter. . . .  Going forward, we will no longer be divided, misled, mis-
informed.  This is our union and we are taking it back.”).
40. See Berri, supra note 13 (noting NBA owners viewed decreasing player sala-
ries as a mechanism to increase team competitive balance in the league).
41. See NBA 2005 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, art. VII, sec. 2(e) (1)
(Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005  [hereinafter 2005 NBA CBA]
(“In the event that for any Salary Cap Year Total Salaries and Benefits is less than
57% of BRI, the difference shall be paid by the NBA to the Players Association no
later than thirty (30) days following the completion of the Audit Report for such
Salary Cap Year for distribution to all NBA players who were on an NBA roster
during the Season covered by such Salary Cap Year on such proportional basis as
may be reasonably determined by the Players Association.”). See also id. art. VII,
sec. 12(b) (3) (providing that Designated Percentage for each Salary Cap Year is
57%, subject to few limited exceptions that would increase Designated Percentage
up to maximum of 58%).
42. See Text of Letter to NBPA Members, ESPN (Oct. 5, 2011, 12:19 PM), http://
espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7062675/letter-nbpa-members-billy-hunter-derek-
fisher (writing that, prior to October 4, 2011, NBA owners “had stood on an offer
averaging 46% of BRI, rolling back this year’s salaries and benefits to $2 billion flat
and growing very slowly over ten years. . . . They began the day offering an increase
of just over one point—to an average of 47%. (They characterized the proposal as
a 50-50 split, but with a new $350 million expense deduction, their offer would
actually result in the players receiving only 47% of current BRI.”)).
10
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percentage over the course of a six-year deal to 54%—resulting in
an average of 53%.43  In November 2011, Commissioner Stern sent
a memo to NBA players explaining that under the NBA’s proposal,
players would be guaranteed to receive 50% of BRI.44  The players
and owners eventually agreed that, for the 2011-2012 NBA season,
players would receive 51.15% of BRI.45  For all subsequent seasons
under the 2011 CBA, players would receive salaries and benefits
equal to 50% of BRI—subject to a few limited exceptions that could
either increase players’ split of BRI to a maximum of 51% or de-
crease players’ share to a minimum of 49%.46  The decrease in play-
ers’ share of BRI from 57% under the 2005 CBA to approximately
50% under the current 2011 CBA resulted in an annual revenue
shift of between $225 million to $300 million from players to
owners.47
B. Salary Cap and Luxury Tax
The salary cap for the 2011-2012 NBA season was set at $58.044
million, which was equal to the salary cap for the prior NBA season
(2010-2011).48  Under the 2005 CBA, teams were only required to
spend at least 75% of the salary cap on player salaries.49  The 2011
43. See id. (“This offer—measured against our current system which guaran-
tees us 57% of BRI—shifts an average of $185 million per year to the owners’ side,
for a total of $1.1 billion over six years.  We feel this offer —which would involve
no rollbacks of existing contracts and maintain the current Salary Cap and Luxury
Tax levels—is fair and addresses the owners’ complaints.”).
44. See Memorandum from David Stern, Comm’r, NBA, to NBA Players, Re:
Collective Bargaining (Nov. 13, 2011), available at http://managingsport.com/
files/MgSport-NBA_Carta_David_Stern_a_Jugadores_NBA_13_Noviembre_2011
.pdf (noting NBA’s proposal in response to NBPA).
45. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, Sec. 12(b) (3) (“The Designated
Share for the 2011-12 Salary Cap Year shall equal 51.15% of BRI.”).
46. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, Sec. 12(b) (3) (providing that “in no
event shall the Designated Share for any Salary Cap Year commencing with the
2012-13 Salary Cap Year be less than 49% of BRI or greater than 51% of BRI”).
47. See Lance Taubin, Welcome to the Real 2011 NBA Lockout: Where Owner-
Friendly Tax Provisions and Non-Monetized Benefits Color the Lockout Landscape, 11 CAR-
DOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & EHTICS J. 139, 140-41 (2012).
48. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, sec. 2 (“The Salary Cap for the 2011-
12 Salary Cap Year will equal $58.044 million.”).  The salary cap for future seasons
under the 2011 CBA will be at least $58.044 million. See id.  The salary cap could
also increase based on a formula that involves projected BRI. See id.  The salary cap
has increased since the 2011-2012 NBA season. See id.  The salary cap for the 2014-
2015 NBA season is $63.1 million. See id.
49. See 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 41, art. VII, sec. 2(b) (1) (“For each Salary
Cap Year during the term of this Agreement, there shall be a Minimum Team
Salary equal to 75% of the Salary Cap for such Salary Cap Year. The Minimum
Team Salary for the 2005-06 Salary Cap Year for all Teams other than the Charlotte
Bobcats shall be deemed to be $37.125 million. The Minimum Team Salary for the
11
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CBA required teams to spend at least 85% of the salary cap during
the first two years of the CBA and a minimum of 90% of the salary
cap amount for all future seasons during which the 2011 CBA is in
effect.50
NBA owners initially proposed a hard salary cap, which would
not allow teams to exceed a specific payroll (i.e., salary cap) thresh-
old.  The owners eventually backed away from this hard cap re-
quirement and agreed to maintain the existent soft cap system.
Owners still insisted on a “harder cap” that would modify existing
salary cap exceptions, while also eliminating other exceptions.51
For example, owners and players agreed to revise the Mid-Level Sal-
ary Exception, which resulted in modifications to contract length
and allowable salaries.  Under the 2005 CBA, the Mid-Level Salary
Exception allowed teams to sign players to five-year contracts start-
ing at 108% of the average NBA player salary with 8% annual in-
creases permitted.52  The 2011 CBA contains different Mid-Level
Salary Exceptions based on a team’s payroll.  For instance, under
the 2011 CBA, for non-taxpaying teams, i.e., teams that do not ex-
ceed a specified team payroll of $4 million more than the luxury tax
threshold, the Non-Taxpayer Mid-Level Salary Exception allows
teams to sign a player for a contract of up to four years in length,
with a starting salary of $5 million in 2011-2012 and with 3% annual
raises permitted after the 2012-2013 NBA season.53  For taxpaying
teams, the Taxpayer Mid-Level Salary Exception in the current CBA
allows teams to sign a player for a contract of up to three years, with
2005-06 Salary Cap Year for the Charlotte Bobcats shall be deemed to be $27.844
million.”).
50. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, sec. 2(b) (1) (“For the 2011-12 Salary
Cap Year, there shall be a Minimum Team Salary equal to $46.435 million.  For the
2012-13 Salary Cap Year, there shall be a Minimum Team Salary equal to 85% of
the Salary Cap for such Salary Cap Year.  For each Salary Cap Year thereafter dur-
ing the term of this Agreement, there shall be a Minimum Team Salary equal to
90% of the Salary Cap for such Salary Cap Year.”).
51. See Stern, supra note 44 (noting NBA’s “move away from a ‘hard’ salary
cap”); see also Text of Letter to NBPA Members, supra note 42 (reporting following
statement in letter: “After two years of hard cap proposals, the owners recently
agreed to consider retaining a soft cap system. They have asked us to address their
concerns that we (1) help to better match pay for performance and (2) improve
competitive balance among the teams.”).
52. See 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 41, art. VII, sec. 6(e) (“A Team may sign
one (1) or more Player Contracts during each Salary Cap Year, not to exceed five
(5) Seasons in length, that, in the aggregate, provide for Salaries and Unlikely
Bonuses in the first Salary Cap Year totaling up to 108% of the Average Player
Salary for the prior Salary Cap Year . . .”).
53. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, sec. 6(e).
12
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a starting salary of $3 million and with 3% annual increases
permitted.54
To increase competitive balance, NBA owners also proposed
modifications to the luxury tax system, which financially penalizes
teams with total player salaries that exceed the luxury tax threshold.
NBA players conceded on this issue.  The 2005 CBA required teams
who exceeded the luxury tax threshold to pay $1 to the league for
every dollar the team’s payroll exceeded the luxury tax threshold;
this money was the primary source of funding for the league’s reve-
nue sharing system.55  The 2011 CBA provided that this dollar-for-
dollar luxury tax penalty would remain consistent for the first two
seasons of the 2011 CBA.  However, beginning in the third season
(2013-2014), a progressive luxury tax system was to apply, in which
the tax rate increases for every $5 million that a team exceeds the
tax level.  For instance, the tax rate is $1.50-for-$1 if a team exceeds
the tax level but is less than $5 million above the level.  The tax rate
is $2.50-for-$1 for teams that exceed the tax level by at least $10
million but by less than $15 million.  And, the tax rate is $3.75-for-
$1 if a team exceeds the tax level by at least $20 million but by less
than $25 million.56  In addition, the 2011 CBA provides for even
more punitive financial penalties if teams exceed the luxury tax
threshold in at least four out of any five seasons.57  The overall goal
of this new luxury tax system is to deter teams from spending signif-
icantly above the luxury tax threshold in order to decrease the fi-
nancial disparity between big market and small market teams.  The
NBA is permitted to distribute up to 50% of the proceeds from the
luxury tax system to teams that do not exceed the luxury tax thresh-
old as one component of the league’s current revenue sharing
plan.58
54. See id. art. VII, sec. 6(f) (noting 2011 CBA also contains third exception,
Mid-Level Exception for Room Teams).  This exception allows teams that have not
exceeded the salary cap to sign a player to a contract of up to two years in length
with a starting salary of $2.5 million and 3% annual increases. See id. art. VII, sec.
6(g) (highlighting tax effects on different teams throughout league).
55. See 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 41, art. VII, sec. 12(f) (1) (“Each Team
whose Team Salary exceeds the Tax Level for any Salary Cap Year shall be required
to pay a tax to the NBA equal to the amount by which the Team’s Team Salary
exceeds the Tax Level.”).
56. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, sec. 12(f) (1).
57. See 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 41, art. VII, sec. 12(f) (1) (iii)-(iv).
58. See id. art. VII, sec. 12(g) (2) (1) (“[T]he NBA may elect to distribute up
to 50% of such amounts to one (1) or more Teams based in whole or in part on
the fact that such Team(s) did now owe a tax for such Salary Cap Year (e.g., the
NBA could elect to distribute 50% of such amounts in equal shares to all non-
taxpayers in such Salary Cap Year)”).
13
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C. Player Contracts: Guaranteed Contracts, Contract Length,
and Annual Salary Increases
The owners initially proposed eliminating guaranteed con-
tracts.59  NBA players understandably pushed back on this issue.
Owners and players eventually agreed that salary guarantees would
remain the same as under the 2005 CBA—which followed that in-
dustry standard that all player salaries are 100% guaranteed unless
otherwise agreed to by a team and player.  While owners conceded
on the contract guarantee issue, players conceded on several other
items related to maximum contract lengths and annual increases
for rookie contract extensions as well as veteran contract exten-
sions.  For example, under the 2005 CBA teams were allowed to
offer six year contracts with 10.5% annual increases in order to re-
tain a free agent who played at least the prior three seasons with
that team (i.e., a “Bird player”60); moreover, teams could offer five
year contracts with 8% annual increases to free agents who played
for a different team the preceding season.61  The 2011 CBA re-
duced allowed contract lengths and decreased permitted annual
percentage raises.  For instance, the maximum contract length al-
lowed for Bird players is now five years (as compared with six years
in the 2005 CBA) and maximum annual increases are now 7.5% (as
compared with 10.5% in the 2005 CBA).  In addition, for other free
agents the maximum contract length allowed is now four years (as
compared with five years in the 2005 CBA) and maximum annual
increases are now 4.5% (as compared with 8% in the 2005 CBA).62
Players and owners also negotiated and agreed to several addi-
tional provisions related to player contracts and player mobility
(i.e., free agency).  For example, the 2011 CBA contains an “am-
nesty provision” that allows each team to waive one player that was
under contract when the CBA was entered into in December 2011;
the team would still be required to pay the player but that player’s
salary would not count for salary cap purposes.63  In addition, quali-
59. See NBA Owners No Longer Insist on Non-Guaranteed Contracts, NBA (June 17,
2011, 8:26 PM), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/06/17/labor-update.ap/ (con-
firming that “NBA owners relaxed their insistence on non-guaranteed contracts . . .
but players cautioned that isn’t enough because the league is still seeking a hard
salary cap”).
60. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VII, sec. 6(b). The Larry Bird Exception is
also called the “Veteran Free Agent Exception,” which allows the incumbent team
to offer a higher salary amount and a longer salary length as compared with a new
team.
61. See 2005 NBA CBA, supra note 41, art. VII, sec. 5(c), 6(b).
62. See id. art. VII, sec. 5(c), 6(b); id. art. II, sec. 7.
63. See id. art. VII, sec. 12(j).
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fying offers are now in part based on player performance.  This is a
change from the qualifying offer model in the 2005 CBA. For exam-
ple, if a player picked 10th to 30th in the first round meets one of
the following two “Starter Criteria,” then the player’s qualifying of-
fer amount will be equal to the qualifying offer for the 9th overall
draft pick: (1) started an average of 41 regular season games or
played an average of 2,000 regular season minutes during third and
fourth seasons combined; or (2) started at least 41 regular season
games or played at least 2,000 minutes during fourth season.  In
addition, if a player picked 1st to 14th in the first round fails to
meet the Starter Criteria, then the player’s qualifying offer amount
will be equal to the qualifying offer for the 15th overall draft pick.64
This new qualifying offer model in the current CBA attempts to
address the issue that a player’s market value (and corresponding
salary) during his fifth year in the league should not be determined
solely by when that player was drafted four years prior.
The above examples are intended to provide an overview of
some of the key business issues that were negotiated and ultimately
resolved in 2010-2011.  Agreeing on the above terms called for a lot
of time and energy, and reaching an agreement was not without
numerous business and legal challenges.  The following section
provides a recap of the extensive and intensive collective bargaining
and legal processes that eventually led to the owners and players
agreeing on a new CBA.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS: HOW
THE LAW IMPACTED BUSINESS DECISIONS
In January 2010, the NBA sent its initial proposal to the NBPA.
As discussed above, this initial proposal sought to implement a hard
salary cap, drastically decrease the players’ share of BRI (i.e., re-
duce and roll back player salaries), and reduce contract length and
salary guarantees.  The NBPA responded with a counter-proposal in
July 2010.  Little progress was made between July 2010 and Decem-
ber 2010.  The league and players fundamentally disagreed over
league revenue and league financial viability.  In December 2010,
NBA spokesperson Mike Bass issued the following statement: “Our
64. See id. art. XI.  Players and owners also agreed to shorten the period that a
player’s team has to match an offer sheet extended to a restricted free agent from
a period of 7 days under the 2005 CBA to 3 days under the 2011 CBA.  This change
was intended to address the issue of teams demonstrating reluctance to extend
offer sheets to restricted free agents because the amount of that offer was “on the
books” for salary cap purposes for 7 days under the 2005 CBA. See id. art. XI, sec.
5(e).
15
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goal remains the same: a sustainable business model that encour-
ages teams to make necessary investments and provides the oppor-
tunity for all 30 teams to compete for a championship.”65 In
February 2011, Billy Hunter issued a statement explaining that
“[t]here has been ongoing debate and disagreement regarding the
numbers and we do not agree that the stated loss figures reflect an
accurate portrayal of the financial health of the league.”66
With little progression evident at the negotiation table, the
NBPA turned to the legal system in May 2014 by filing a complaint
with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the NBA was
failing to negotiate in good faith; the NBPA accused the league of
making “harsh, inflexible and grossly regressive takeaway de-
mands,” failing to “provide relevant financial information,” “repeat-
edly threatening” to lock out the players, and “making demands
and threats that are inherently destructive of the collective bargain-
ing process.”67
The NBA and the NBPA failed to reach agreement on a new
CBA before the June 30, 2011 deadline.  On June 30, 2011, Adam
Silver, the then-NBA Deputy Commissioner, made this statement:
“The expiring collective bargaining agreement created a broken
system that produced huge financial losses for our teams . . . . We
will continue to make every effort to reach a new agreement that is
fair and in the best interests of our teams, our players, our fans, and
our game.”68  The NBA announced that it was commencing a lock-
out of its players effective as of 12:01 a.m. on July 1, 2011.69
65. Art Garcia, Hunter Lays Out Proposal for Players, Shoots Down Hard Cap, NBA
(Dec. 8, 2010, 12:06 PM) http://www.nba.com/2010/news/features/art_garcia/
12/08/union-proposal/ (explaining that, before 2010-2011 NBA season Commis-
sioner Stern said that reduction of $750-800 million in salaries was needed under
new CBA to ensure financial health of all teams in league).
66. Abrams, supra note 38.  The NBPA distributed a “Lockout Handbook” to
all NBA players in which Billy Hunter wrote the following: “Prepare yourself finan-
cially.  A lockout is VERY likely and you must be financially prepared to manage it.
The revenue increases and unprecedented growth the league is experiencing has
done nothing to assuage ownership’s demand that we drastically reduce player
salaries and benefits.” See NBPA, Lockout Handbook: Hope for the Best, Prepare for the
Worst (2011) (explaining how players cannot expect league expansion to solidify
and improve their job positions).
67. See Howard Beck, Turning to Labor Board, N.B.A. Union Fires First, N.Y.
TIMES (May 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/sports/basketball/
players-accuse-nba-of-failing-to-bargain-in-good-faith.html?_r=0; Howard Beck,
Turning to Labor Board, N.B.A. Union Fires First, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at B12.
68. NBA Commences Lockout of Its Players, supra note 8.
69. Locking out the players is a strategy of exerting economic pressure on the
players as a means for increasing the league’s leverage for obtaining concessions
from the NBPA during the negotiation process. See William B. Gould, IV, The 2011
Basketball Lockout: The Union Lives to Fight Another Day—Just Barely, 64 STAN. L. REV.
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A little over a month later, on August 2, 2011, the NBA decided
to file its own complaint with the National Labor Relations Board
claiming that the NBPA has failed to collectively bargain in good
faith.  The NBA also alleged that the NBPA had engaged in the
“impermissible negotiating tactic” of threatening to decertify (or
disclaim interest in) representing players and subsequently file an
antitrust lawsuit as a means to create leverage in the collective bar-
gaining process.70  Also on August 2, 2011, the NBA filed a lawsuit
asking a federal court to rule that the league’s lockout was pro-
tected by the nonstatutory labor exemption and therefore did not
violate antitrust laws.71
Despite the ongoing litigation, the NBA and the NBPA contin-
ued to engage in collective bargaining sessions, including a meeting
on October 4, 2011.  In a letter from then-current NBPA executive
director Billy Hunter and then-current NBPA president Derek
Fisher to all NBA players, Hunter and Fisher wrote the following:
We will continue to review the numbers and assess the va-
rious proposals, but we will hold firm until we can get a
fair deal.  While this negotiation is far from over, we can-
not now say when it will resume again in earnest.  For to-
day, the players made a stand.  It was the right stand to
make for ourselves and for the generations of players to
follow.72
ONLINE 51 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/2011-basketball-
lockout; see also Paul D. Staudohar, The Basketball Lockout of 2011, MONTHLY LAB.
REV. 28, 29 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/12/art3full
.pdf (“A lockout can motivate the players to make concessions and often leads to a
better deal for the owners.”).
70. Federal labor law encourages collective bargaining and insulates the re-
sults of collective bargaining from antitrust scrutiny, even in situations where
agreed upon terms might be anticompetitive. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
518 U.S. 231, at 237 (1996) (noting that “the implicit [i.e., nonstatutory labor]
exemption recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and to
allow meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on competi-
tion imposed through the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanc-
tions”). Historically, players associations have disclaimed interest in functioning as
the exclusive collective bargaining representative of players (i.e., terminate the col-
lective bargaining relationship between a players association and the respective
league) to attempt to take advantage of federal antitrust laws.  NFL players re-
sorted to this negotiation tactic in 2011, as the NFL players association purportedly
disclaimed interest in functioning as the collective bargaining representative of
players; players subsequently filed an antitrust lawsuit against the NFL. See Com-
plaint, Brady v. NFL, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Minn. Apr. 25, 2011) .
71. See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, NBA v. NBPA,
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2011) (No. 11-cv-05369) [hereinafter NBA v. NBPA Complaint]
72. Text of letter to NBPA Members, supra note 42.
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Because no bargaining agreement had been agreed upon, the NBA
canceled the first two weeks of the regular season on October 10,
2011.73
On November 13, 2011 the NBA sent a memorandum to all
players that included an overview of the NBA’s revised proposal and
which encouraged the players:
to focus on the numerous compromises that were made to
the NBA’s initial bargaining positions in these negotia-
tions, including our move away from a “hard” salary cap,
the withdrawal of our proposal to “roll back” salaries in
existing player contracts, our agreement to continue to al-
low players to negotiate fully guaranteed contracts, and
our agreement to a 50/50 split of BRI . . . .  We urge you
to study our proposal carefully, and to accept it as a fair
compromise of the issues between us.74
During the next few days, the NBPA disclaimed its status as the
NBA players’ collective bargaining representative.75  NBA players
then filed two lawsuits in federal courts alleging that the NBA was in
violation of antitrust laws because the league refused to allow play-
ers to work.76  Commissioner Stern warned that, as a result of these
antitrust lawsuits, “We’re about to go into the nuclear winter of the
NBA.”77
73. See NBA Cancels First Two Weeks of 2011-12 Regular Season, NBA (Oct. 10,
2011, 10:04 PM), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/10/10/nba-games/.
74. Memorandum from David Stern, Comm’r of NBA, to NBA Players (Nov.
13, 2011), available at http://www.cbssports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/22748484/
33309672/2.
75. See Letter from G. William Hunter, Derek Fisher, and the NBPA Executive
Committee to All Players (Nov. 14, 2011), available at http://usatoday30.usatoday
.com/sports/story/2011-11-14/NBA-union-letter-sent-to-players-Monday/
51206352/1 (explaining that “[f]or two and a half years and through more than 50
collective bargaining sessions, we sat at the table and attempted to negotiate a fair
labor agreement with the owners . . . It has become clear to us that we have ex-
hausted our rights under the labor laws, and continuing in that forum would not
be in the best interest of the players”).
76. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand of Plaintiff at 5,
Anthony v. NBA, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011) (No. C11-05525) (alleging the NBA was
engaged in an illegal “group boycott and price fixing system to reduce the salaries,
terms, benefits, and conditions of employment available in the market for
players”).
77. NBPA Rejects Owners’ Offer, Begins to Disband as Union, NBA (Nov. 14, 2011,
10:30 AM) http://www.nba.com/2011/news/11/14/nbpa-labor-meeting-mon-
day.ap/.  Stern expressed additional thoughts on the NBPA antitrust lawsuits: “It’s
just a big charade.  To do it now, the union is ratcheting up I guess to see if they
can scare the NBA owners or something.  That’s not happening.” Id.
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Within two weeks of the players filing antitrust lawsuits, the
NBA and its players had a tentative agreement in place on Novem-
ber 26, 2011.78  The NBA issued a “Summary of Principal Deal
Terms” document, which detailed the key negotiated provisions,
for example, BRI split, salary cap and luxury tax system, contract
length and salary, and free agency rules.79  On December 8, 2011,
the NBA announced that a new CBA had been approved and the
NBA would begin the 2011-2012 regular season on Christmas Day.80
Commissioner Stern said:
I am pleased to announce that we have concluded the col-
lective bargaining process and have reached an agreement
that addresses many significant issues that were challenges
to our league . . . . This collective bargaining agreement
will help us move toward a better business model, a more
competitive league and better alignment between com-
pensation and performance.81
78. See cf. Gould, supra note 68, at 56 (expressing the viewpoint that NBPA
lawsuits “seems to have moved the parties together.  It most certainly called the
NBA’s bluff, in that the league’s regressive or inferior option was quickly forgot-
ten”). See also Berri, supra note 13, at 169 (noting that importance of filing the
antitrust lawsuits “was not so much the likelihood the courts would side with the
players.  The key issue was that this move posed a serious threat to the owners’
revenues.”).  Any monetary damages awarded by a court based on federal antitrust
violations are automatically tripled based on a federal statute called the Clayton
Act of 1914—this financial reality is what posed a genuine revenue threat to the
owners.
79. See Berri, supra note 13, at 169 (“[T]he big winners [with respect to the
2011 NBA CBA] were the owners of small-market teams . . . . [the new agreement]
will allow small-market teams to earn more money, regardless of the quality of the
product offered on the court.”).
80. See NBA Board of Governors Ratify 10-Year CBA, supra note 16.  The NBA and
NBPA agreed on a new CBA before any of the ongoing lawsuits and NLRB disputes
were resolved.  As a result, numerous legal questions regarding the collective bar-
gaining process were not decided by the NLRB or the courts. See Sedeh, supra note
27, at 59 (questioning if “the N.B.P.A.’s disclaimer of interest . . . [was] valid, thus
terminating the nonstatutory exemption and allowing the N.B.P.A. to bring an
antitrust action”).
81. NBA Board of Governors Ratify 10-Year CBA, supra note 16 (reporting former
Commissioner Stern’s statement).  According to well-respected labor expert and
sport law professor William Gould, “[w]hat appeared to be a rout of the players in
November emerged as a reasonable face-saving compromise.”  Gould, supra note
69, at 56.  According to another sports law scholar, “[p]layer concessions were pre-
dictable because the NBA’s economic structure desperately needed an overhaul.
The magnitude of such concessions, however, was startling.”  Matthew J. Parlow,
Lessons from the NBA Lockout: Union Democracy, Public Support, and the Folly of the Na-
tional Basketball Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014).
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IV. ANTICIPATING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
IN 2016-2017
Similar to the 2010-2011 collective bargaining process, the
NBA and the NBPA are attempting to shape the narrative through
media reports and public perception and to create negotiation lev-
erage related to the collective bargaining process.  During an Octo-
ber 2014 press conference that followed an NBA Board of
Governors meeting in New York, Commissioner Silver downplayed
any possible level of concern about a potential work stoppage in the
NBA during the 2017-2018 NBA season in the following statement:
I’ve said previously, we didn’t get everything we wanted in
the last collective bargaining cycle . . . .  It’s premature
even for me to be concerned.  We negotiated a 10-year col-
lective bargaining agreement, there is a six-year out for ei-
ther side. We are going into year four. We have, in my
mind, something that is incredibly positive and that is two
new great media deals. Fifty-one percent of that money
goes to the players.82
In November 2014, NBPA executive director Michele Roberts re-
sponded: “I’ll give the league credit.  They have done a great job
controlling the narrative.”83  Roger Mason Jr., NBPA director of
player relations, similarly commented:
No player, no fan, and even the union, we don’t want a
lockout, we don’t want a strike. . . .  But, at the same time,
sometimes the cost of doing business is standing firm on
what you believe in. And I think us, as players, we believe
in the fact that we work really hard. We’re all very fortu-
nate to even be in a position to make this kind of money.84
Almost all of the system issues that were central to the negotiation
process in 2010-2011 are once again surfacing as primary issues for
the next collective bargaining session that will likely commence in
2016, if not sooner.
82. See Youngmisuk, supra note 28.
83. Pablo S. Torre, NBPA Director: ‘Let’s Stop Pretending’, ESPN (Nov. 13, 2014,
2:06 PM), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/11868612/nba-owners-expenda-
ble-players-union-chief-michele-roberts-says. When Michele Roberts criticized sev-
eral aspects of the current NBA business model in November 2014, Commissioner
Silver responded: “We will address all of these topics and others with the Players
Association at the appropriate time.” Id.
84. Ira Winderman, Fight to Avert 2017 NBA Lockout Starts Now, SUN SENTINEL
(Nov. 22, 2014, 11:29 AM), http://touch.sun-sentinel.com/?dssReturn#section/-
1/article/p2p-82051023/&z=32828.
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V. ANTICIPATED KEY BUSINESS / SYSTEM ISSUES DURING 2016-2017
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS
A. Basketball Related Income
Expect the owners to once again push for a reduction in the
percentage of BRI that players receive as well as a modification to
the current formula for determining BRI.85  Remember that in
2010-2011, the owners’ initial proposal set players’ share of BRI at
46-47%.  On the other side, there is no question the NBPA will seek
to increase the current BRI percentage (between 49% and 51%
each year under the current CBA).  Michele Roberts said the fol-
lowing about the current BRI split:
Why don’t we have the owners play half the games? . . .
There would be no money if not for the players . . . I know
that as a result of the last CBA, at least 1.3 billion dollars in
revenue that would have otherwise been on the players’
side is now on the owners’ side. I see the valuations of
these teams going though the roof. . . .  How much more
do you need to make money?86
Roberts reiterated that it is the responsibility of the NBPA “to en-
sure that the players receive their fair share of the results of their
efforts.”87
B. Salary Cap
NBA owners will likely make another push to implement a
harder salary cap with fewer exceptions than in the current salary
85. For example, the NBA might ask that specific revenue streams be ex-
cluded from the BRI formula to reduce the total amount of money that NBA own-
ers are required to share with players.  NBA owners will also likely push for a
modification to NBA CBA, Article VII, Section 12(b) (3), which currently provides
that the players designated share will increase by 60.5% of the difference between
actual BRI and projected BRI in years where actual BRI exceeds forecasted BRI.
This provision provides significant upside to players in years where actual BRI
greatly exceeds forecasted BRI.  The players’ designated share of BRI cannot ex-
ceed 51% of BRI under the current CBA.
86. Torre, supra note 83. LeBron James commented: “The whole thing that
went on with the negotiation process was that the owners were telling us that they
were losing money. . . . There is no way they can sit in front of us and tell us that
right now.”  Harvey Araton, Owners Can’t Line Their Pockets Now and Cry Poverty Later,
LeBron James Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/
07/sports/basketball/lebron-james-nba-television-deal-revenue-espn-tnt.html?smid
%3D=tw-nytsports&_r=0.
87. Scott Soshnick, LeBron James Will Reap $50 Million More From TV Deals,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2014, 12:56), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-06/
lebron-james-will-reap-50-million-more-from-nba-tv-deals.html.
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cap system.  Commissioner Silver opined that he would prefer “to
have a harder cap, where teams couldn’t elect to spend so much
more than other teams . . . There’s gradations of hardness in terms
of the cap as well. I wish our current cap system was harder. It’s
what we proposed last time around, but we compromised.”88 Mi-
chele Roberts is not a proponent of a salary cap altogether.  Roberts
stated, “I don’t know of any space other than the world of sports
where there’s this notion that we will artificially deflate what some-
one’s able to make, just because. . . .  It’s incredibly un-American.
My DNA is offended by it.”89
Commissioner Silver responded to Roberts’s comments with a
statement that in part provided that there is nothing:
unusual or ‘un-American’ in a unionized industry to have
a collective system for paying employees—in fact, that’s
the norm. . . . The salary cap system, which splits revenues
between team owners and players and has been agreed
upon by the NBA and the players association since 1982,
has served as a foundation for the growth of the league
and has enabled NBA players to become the highest-paid
professional athletes in the world.90
C. Player Contracts: Contract Length, Salary Amount,
and Guaranteed Salaries
The NBA might once again push for reductions in contract
length and allowable salary amounts.  The NBPA will likely want to
revise rules related rookie scale salaries and maximum player con-
tracts.  Michele Roberts offered her view on maximum contracts:
I can’t understand why the [players’ association] would be
interested in suppressing salaries at the top if we know
that as salaries at the top have grown, so have salaries at
the bottom. . . .  If that’s the case, I contend that there is
no reason in the world why the union should embrace sal-
ary caps or any effort to place a barrier on the amount of
money that marquee players can make.91
88. Ken Berger, Adam Silver: ‘My Preference Would Be To Have a Harder Cap’,
CBS SPORTS (Oct. 22, 2014, 3:39 PM ET), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/writer/
ken-berger/24763615/adam-silver-my-preference-would-be-to-have-a-harder-cap.
89. Torre, supra note 83.
90. Torre, supra note 83.
91. Id.
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D. Free Agency System & Qualifying Offers
The NBPA will likely advocate for changes to the NBA’s cur-
rent restricted free agency system and qualifying offer rules.  The
current NBA CBA rules pertaining to restricted free agency give a
player’s prior team a significant advantage in being able to retain
the player’s services under a new contract.92  The prior team has a
right of first refusal to match any offer sheet that the player signs
with a new team.  The NBPA might try to shift the leverage from
team to player during the restricted free agency process.  In addi-
tion, the NBPA might push to change the existing qualifying offer
system, which remains a seldom used and imbalanced one-year con-
tract model that usually does not produce fair and mutually benefi-
cial results for teams and players.93
E. Minimum Age Requirement to Enter NBA Draft
In a December 2014 interview with GQ Magazine, Commis-
sioner Silver was asked the following question: “If you could in-
stantly change anything about the NBA, without having to negotiate
the terms or compromise your position, what change would you
make?”  Silver stated that he would create a harder salary cap.  He
said the second item he would change is the minimum age re-
quired to enter the NBA draft from 19 to 20 years of age.  Silver
explained that the NBA:
bargained with the union many years ago in order to move
it from 18 to 19. Going to 20 was on the table during the
last bargaining cycle [in 2011], but it was an issue we
parked, having already lost several weeks of the season
[due to the lockout], and we were anxious to get the sea-
92. Any first round pick who finishes the fourth season of his rookie scale
contract (which is for two guaranteed years and two team option years), and any
veteran free agent who will have three or fewer years of service entering the off-
season, will be a restricted free agent if his prior team makes a qualifying offer to
the player at any time from the day following the season (e.g., in mid-June after the
NBA Finals) through June 30.  If such a qualifying offer is made, then, on July 1,
the player will become a restricted free agent, subject to a right of first refusal in
favor of the prior team. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. XI, sec. 4.
93. See Scott Bukstein & Jacob Eisenberg, Implementing a Franchise Player Desig-
nation System in the NBA, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. (forthcoming), to learn more
about a proposed franchise player designation system that would complement and
improve the NBA’s restricted free agency system and also partially replace the
NBA’s current qualifying offer system.
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son going. But it’s something I hope to address in the near
future.94
As expected, Michele Roberts has a different perspective than Com-
missioner Silver on the age limit issue.  Roberts said the following:
It doesn’t make sense to me that you’re suddenly eligible
and ready to make money when you’re 20, but not when
you’re 19, not when you’re 18.  I suspect that the associa-
tion will agree that this is not going to be one that they will
agree to easily. There is no other profession that says that
you’re old enough to die but not old enough to work.95
F. Player Conduct: League Domestic Violence Policy
The NBA is planning to “take a fresh look” at its domestic vio-
lence policies and procedures; for example, by creating programs
to further educate players on domestic violence issues in the wake
of widespread criticism of the NFL for its handling of recent domes-
tic violence situations.96  Currently, the NBA CBA stipulates a mini-
mum 10-game suspension for any player convicted of a violent
felony.97 NBA owners, and Commissioner Silver, will likely attempt
to revise this CBA provision so that domestic violence that does not
94. Chuck Klosterman, Rookie of the Year: Adam Silver, GQ MAG. (Dec. 2014),
http://www.gq.com/moty/2014/adam-silver-rookie-of-the-year.  Commissioner
Silver also explained that the NBPA’s “principal argument is that it’s a restriction
on players.” Id. He commented further:
And as a philosophical argument, I totally understand that. Of course it’s
a restriction, in the same way a draft is a restriction. But our view is that it
would make for a better league. You’d have more skilled players, more
mature players. The draft would be better. It would be better for basket-
ball in general. Strong college basketball is great for the NBA. And we
know those players are eventually going to come to the NBA, whether
they are 19 or 20 or 21.
Id.
95. Torre, supra note 83.
96. Brian Mahoney, Silver: NBA Will Review Domestic Violence Policies, NBA
(Sept. 22, 2014, 4:14 PM), http://www.nba.com/2014/news/09/22/adam-silver-
nba-domestic-violence.ap/.  Commissioner Silver explained the following:
[The NBA learns] from other leagues’ experiences.  We’re studying eve-
rything that’s been happening in the NFL. We’re working with our play-
ers’ association. . . . We have in place the appropriate mechanisms for
discipline, although we’ll take a fresh look at those as well. . . .  But most
importantly, it’s education, and it’s not just the players, but it’s the play-
ers’ families. That’s what we’re learning, too.
Id.
97. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. VI, sec. 7 (providing that “[w]hen a player
is convicted of (including a plea of guilty, no contest, or nolo contendere to) a
violent felony, he shall immediately be suspended by the NBA for a minimum of
ten (10) games”).
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rise to a felony conviction is still punishable (e.g., minimum 10-
game suspension) and so that Commissioner Silver has more flexi-
bility in general to fine and suspend players for misconduct.
For example, in November 2014, Commissioner Silver sus-
pended Charlotte Hornets’ player Jeffrey Taylor for 24 games after
Taylor pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic violence assault
and malicious destruction of hotel property.  In issuing the suspen-
sion, Commissioner Silver made this statement:
Mr. Taylor’s conduct violates applicable law and, in my
opinion, does not conform to standards of morality and is
prejudicial and detrimental to the NBA . . . . While the
suspension is significantly longer than prior suspensions
for incidents of domestic violence by NBA players, it is ap-
propriate in light of Mr. Taylor’s conduct, the need to de-
ter similar conduct going forward, and the evolving social
consensus—with which we fully concur—that professional
sports leagues like the NBA must respond to such inci-
dents in a more rigorous way.98
Following the announcement of this suspension, Michele Roberts
wrote a memo to all players that in part read:
The CBA contemplates a minimum 10-game suspension in
any case involving a conviction for a violent felony, includ-
ing domestic violence. . . . In contrast, Jeff Taylor was
charged with a misdemeanor that is likely to be dismissed
at the end of a probationary period.  The 24-game suspen-
sion is one of the longest in the history of the league.
We have a scheme of discipline that was the result of col-
lective bargaining between the parties that has been ap-
plied consistently over the years.  While we appreciate the
sensitivity of this societal issue, the Commissioner is not
entitled to rewrite the rules or otherwise ignore precedent
in disciplinary matters.99
Michele Roberts has clearly indicated that no changes to the
league’s domestic violence policy should (or will) take place until
the next round of formal collective bargaining.  In an interview
98. Sam Amick, NBPA Chief: NBA Tried to ‘Out-Muscle’ NFL with Jeffrey Taylor
Suspension, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2014, 9:49 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/nba/2014/11/21/michele-roberts-adam-silver-nba-nbpa-executive-di-
rector/70045956/.
99. Id.
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with Sports Illustrated, she asserted this position: “There are existing
policies in place that were negotiated.  That said, we would be open
to discussions about increased training and education and, most
importantly, developing strategies to prevent domestic violence
from happening in the first place.”100
VI. CONCLUSION: THE EXPECTED OUTCOME
In an interview on ESPN Outside the Lines in December 2014,
ESPN reporter and journalist Andy Katz asked Commissioner Silver
to comment on the threat of the NBPA opting out of the current
CBA.  Commissioner Silver responded:
I take everything that Michele Roberts says very seri-
ously . . . It’s something our owners and teams will study as
we get closer to the six year mark, how the agreement
works for us—and obviously they’re studying it from their
standpoint.  But, my sense is the league is going really well
right now and I think we have a very fair system.  But, they
are our partners.  And to the extent they think it is unfair
and we need to then get together and reexamine it, we
will.  They have the right to do that and we have the obli-
gation to respond.101
Commissioner Silver also made comments during this same in-
terview suggesting that NBA owners are less likely than NBA players
to opt out of the current CBA.  When asked to identify the right
BRI percentage split between owners and players, Commissioner
Silver said the following:
I think the right split is the split that we negotiated with
our players in the last Collective Bargaining Agreement,
and that’s a split that is a sliding scale between 49 and
51% . . . At the time the new television money comes in in
100. Michael McCann, Why The NBA Won’t Touch Its Domestic Violence Policies
Anytime Soon, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.si.com/nba/2014/
10/01/nba-domestic-violence-policy-michele-roberts-jeff-taylor.
101. Outside the Lines with Bob Ley, Interview by Andy Katz, ESPN Reporter and
Journalist, with Adam Silver, NBA Commissioner (ESPN television broadcast, Dec. 19,
2014), available at http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=12053721 (reporting inter-
view by ESPN journalist Andy Katz and NBA Commissioner Adam Silver).  In a
separate interview with ESPNW, Commissioner Silver acknowledged that “no one
at the NBA is underestimating [Roberts] . . . [s]he’s made it clear she will be a
strong advocate for the players.” Kate Fagan, Impact 25: NBA Union Chief Michele
Roberts Knows Exactly What She’s Doing, ESPNW.COM (Dec. 17, 2014), http://espn.go
.com/espnw/news-commentary/article/12025034/nba-union-chief-michele-rob-
erts-knows-exactly-doing.
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the 2016-17 season the players will be receiving 51% of
something that looks very much like the gross revenue
that comes into the league.  So, that strikes me as very
fair.102
Commissioner Silver is being both honest and strategic.  As
previously discussed, the owners were able to convince players to
compromise on a number of significant system issues during the
collective bargaining process in 2010-2011, including a significant
reduction in players’ share of BRI (from 57% to between 49% and
51%).  Overall, the current system is working well for NBA owners.
Therefore, owners might not see much upside to opting out of an
agreement that contains many owner-friendly provisions.103 How-
ever, even if the owners believe opting out of the CBA by December
2016 is the best approach, they might prefer that the players opt
out given the potential negative media coverage and public percep-
tion.104  This strategy would allow the owners to frame any potential
work stoppage as the result of unreasonable player demands in-
stead of owner decisions.  During a November 2014 interview, Mi-
chele Roberts commented: “To the extent that there’s going to be
any pressure on the players to accept some proposal from the own-
ers, that pressure will come from fans, and it will come from fans if
they have an image of the players as greedy and unappreciative.”105
Based on the above analysis in this article, I anticipate the
NBPA provides written notice to the NBA on or before December
15, 2016 notifying the NBA that the NBPA has exercised its option
102. Outside the Lines with Bob Ley, supra note 101.
103. For example, one scholar who examined the 2011 collective bargaining
process opined that “[i]f you were an owner, though, and you were interested in
capturing more revenue, than this agreement clearly works.  In other words, the
players clearly lost.”  Berri, supra note 13, at 167.  Collective bargaining should
focus on win/win solutions instead of creating an apparent winner and loser. See
Staudohar, supra note 69 (noting that “collective bargaining outside of profes-
sional sports typically has been less adversarial”).
104. See Andrew Keh & Harvey Araton, Establishing Her Position in the Post, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/sports/basketball/
michele-roberts-new-nba-players-union-leader-isnt-afraid-to-throw-elbows.html?_
r=0 (explaining that any substantive negotiations with league will take place in
private, but Roberts understands importance of “shaping the perceptions of the
NBA” and protecting “the image of the players” who Roberts believed were labeled
as “money hungry” during 2010-2011 collective bargaining process).
105. Id. See also Fagan, supra note 101 (quoting Michele Roberts: “The
league’s narrative was so powerful in 2011 that it even had the fans saying, ‘Share
the money. Don’t stop playing. You make a lot of money.’ I remember thinking,
‘Everyone believes the players make too much money.’”).
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to terminate the CBA effective as of June 30, 2017.106  The subse-
quent collective bargaining process is far less predictable.  Commis-
sioner Silver was the lead negotiator for the NBA during the most
recent collective bargaining process.107  On the other hand, Mi-
chele Roberts, a former public defender, trial lawyer and corporate
attorney with little prior sport business or collective bargaining ex-
perience, will be responsible for “controlling the narrative”108 as
well as building consensus and creating common objectives among
all NBA players.109  Roberts’s initial focus has been to “rally the
troops, restore their confidence in collective bargaining, [and] in-
still some credibility in terms of her own leadership.”110  Roberts
will play a central role in the negotiation process as well as in the
potential litigation process should the NBA and NBPA reach an im-
passe in collective bargaining.111  One NBA player agent is of the
view that Roberts is “itching for a fight.”112  Based on Roberts’s legal
background as a trial lawyer, her preferred forum might be the
courtroom instead of the negotiating table.  A separate NBA player
agent commented: “If there’s a lockout, I would bet you she would
106. See NBA CBA, supra note 2, art. XXXIX, sec. 2 (explaining requirements
for opting out of CBA).
107. See Staudohar, supra note 69 (“Although Stern led the owners, much of
the face-to-face negotiation at the bargaining table was handled by deputy commis-
sioner Adam Silver.”).
108. See Fagan, supra note 101 (writing that “Roberts is a master at controlling
narrative, a skill that will almost definitely be tested in the coming years, when the
NBA and players’ association are back at the negotiating table”).
109. For a discussion on how the NBPA’s arguable deficiencies in union de-
mocracy, intra-union communications, and public relations undermined its bar-
gaining position and adversely impacted its negotiation efforts in 2010-2011, see
Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout: Union Democracy, Public Support, and
the Folly of the National Basketball Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2014).  Rob-
erts must “come across as a strong figure to the players, unify them, and, as well,
influence public opinion.” Keh & Araton, supra note 104.
110. Keh & Araton, supra note 104 (quoting labor expert and sport law pro-
fessor William B. Gould IV).
111. See Deveney, supra note 12 (quoting one NBA player agent as stating that
the NBPA needs “a skilled, innovative, experienced businessperson at the top of
the chain . . . .  [Otherwise] there will be a lockout and the players will suffer.”).
112. Sean Deveney, The Baseline: NBPA’s Michele Roberts ‘Itching for a Fight,’
SPORTING NEWS (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/story/2014-
11-21/nbpa-nba-union-michele-roberts-adam-silver-billy-hunter-jeffery-taylor-
agents (“She’s serious, she is impressive.  She is coming at this from an outsider’s
perspective.  With Billy, he accepted that the system we have is what it is, and all we
can do is try to protect as much ground as possible.  Michele is a clean slate, she
flat-out sees some of the things we accept as wrong.”).
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decertify the next day and get it into a courtroom.  She’s a trial
lawyer, that’s her strength.”113
I anticipate that the NBPA and the NBA will fail to reach agree-
ment on a new CBA before the June 30, 2017 deadline.  As a result,
at 12:01 a.m. on July 1, 2017 the NBA will lock out the players.114
Later that day (July 1, 2017), the NBPA will disclaim interest in
functioning as the collective bargaining representative of NBA play-
ers.  Within a few days, NBA players will file one or more lawsuits in
federal court(s) alleging that the lockout is illegal and that many of
the NBA’s business practices violate federal antitrust law.115  The
players and owners will continue to negotiate principal deal terms
from July 2017 up until less than a week before the scheduled start
of the regular season in October 2017.  It is also quite possible that
the players and owners fail to agree on certain system issues (for
example, split of BRI) by the scheduled start of the regular season,
which will result in cancellation of regular season games.116
Players will likely negotiate for an increased annual percentage
of BRI between 52% and 54%, and owners will likely insist on modi-
fying other system issues such as implementing a hard salary cap,
the BRI formula and resultant revenue split, and maximum con-
tract salaries and length.  For example, NBA players might request
that salaries under existing player contracts increase based on speci-
fied future increases in league revenues in addition to increasing
the overall future team salary cap amount based on actual increases
113. Id. (“Hunter occasionally offered [the decertification] threat, but was
never really on board with decertification.  Roberts, though, comes to the NBPA
with a reputation as one of the nation’s strongest trial lawyers.”).
114. See Berri, supra note 13, at 167 (explaining that “owners have an incen-
tive to lock the players out in the off-season”).  Past research studies have shown
that lockouts typically do not adversely impact the financial health of host cities
and have no permanent impact on fan attendance. See Dennis Coates & Brad R.
Humphreys, The Economic Consequences of Professional Sports Strikes and Lockouts, 67 S.
ECON. J. 737 (2001); Martin B. Schmidt & David J. Berri, The Impact of Labor Strikes
on Consumer Demand: An Application to Professional Sports, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 344
(2004).
115. The NBA will likely not be extremely concerned with the NBPA dis-
claimer of interest and subsequent lawsuit(s) filed by NBA players. See Michael
McCann, NBA’s New TV Deal Brings Potential Lockout, Expansion Into Play, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 6, 2014),  http://www.si.com/nba/2014/10/06/nba-tv-deal-
adam-silver-lockout-expansion-espn-turner (“The league is also keenly aware that
litigation brought by NFL players to end the NFL’s 2011 lockout failed, thus giving
the NBA more confidence that labor law insulates the league from lockout
liability.”).
116. See Berri, supra note 13, at 159 (describing how collective bargaining pro-
cess often results in loss of games—from 1981 to 2011, eight labor disputes have
led to cancelation of part or all of a regular season in the NBA, NFL, NHL, and
MLB).
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in BRI.  NBA players might also focus on player mobility items such
as a player having the ability to select his new team if multiple teams
claim that player off of waivers, as well as players having both an
early termination option and a player option in the final two years
of a maximum salary contract.
NBA owners might push for a limit on the number of guaran-
teed years in player contracts (e.g., three guaranteed years in a five-
year contract) and might also request that player contracts contain
“conditional guarantees” based on factors such as meeting a mini-
mum “games/minutes played” threshold.  NBA owners might also
focus on decreasing the existing maximum salary percentage
thresholds (e.g., 25% and 30% of salary cap) due to the significant
impending increase in the salary cap from $63 million in 2014-2015
to a projected salary cap of at least $90 million in 2017-2018.  The
NBA will likely make several concessions during the negotiation
process.  For example, the owners will likely trade off on the mini-
mum age eligibility issue to gain leverage with respect to other deal
points.  Players will likely concede on issues such as requesting a
decrease in the number of regular season games, because a de-
crease in the current 82-game schedule would likely result in a re-
duction in BRI—for example, fewer tickets sold and less revenue
from corporate partners—in turn, this would lead to a correspond-
ing reduction in player salaries.  I anticipate the players and owners
will eventually agree to a new “2017 NBA Collective Bargaining
Agreement,” which will once again be a ten year agreement with
mutual opt-out options after year seven or year eight of the new
CBA.
The expected outcome hypothesized above might never mate-
rialize.  It may be several years before we find out.  In the words of
Commissioner Silver:
It’s too early to talk about collective bargaining. When the
time comes to negotiate a new collective bargaining agree-
ment, the facts regarding our finances will speak for them-
selves . . . obviously, we don’t agree on every issue, but we
have a strong relationship based on mutual respect and
our joint interest in the success of the league and game.117
117. Fagan, supra note 101.
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